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Parties in Post-Communist Hungary 
 
Abstract. This paper studies the law pertaining to political parties in Hungary, from the 
viewpoint of establishing and maintaining of political pluralism. In the period of 1989–1990, 
the transition from the one-party system to the democratic and pluralistic state of law could 
be followed up relative to the development of the law pertaining to the political parties, which 
is based on the rules that foreclose the contingent development of unconstitutional political 
system. 
 The paper reviews the concept of the political party according to the constitutional law, 
the normative framework of functioning and the regulations of the internal organization of 
political parties. The provisions of primary importance concern: a) equality of political parties, 
b) forbidden purposes and instruments, c) rules of incompatibility, d) state subvention. Rules 
concerning the internal organization require the openness and the prevailing of democratic 
will-making also inside the political parties, so contribute to the maintaining the democratic 
competition of political parties. 
 The author emphasizes the factors that determine multiparty-system, and argues that 
electoral thresholds and the effective method of state-financing of political parties contest 
the principle of equality and harm the fair-competition. Thresholds and subvention are both 
based on the effectiveness of political parties–though being capable to prevent the party 
system and the parliament from fragmentation, nonetheless, they prefer extensively, if not 
unconstitutionally, the political parties in the Parliament, so they can be seen as being designed 
to protect the current political elite. 
 
Keywords: political parties, party law, political pluralism, state subvention of political 
parties, electoral systems/electoral law 
 
 
Constitutionality, established by provisions affirming and demarcating rights 
as well as by rules safeguarding these rights as institutional guarantees of the 
prevailing social-political system provided under Constitutions, is principally a 
requirement to be observed by governments primarily as a sequel to the grievous 
experiences of history. The bewildering precedent of the Weimar Republic is 
only one regrettable instance to admonish posterity that no political establish-
ment can dispense with the rules that foreclose the contingent development of 
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unconstitutional political systems.1 Nonetheless, according to András Sajó’s 
view, effective Constitutions are not designated to safeguard future societies. 
Since Constitutions are mere corollaries of (“creations related to”) the fears 
generated by previous political systems, they set forth the modus operandi of 
the exercise of political power.2 
 In view of the post-transformation constitutional processes in Central-Eastern-
Europe, it is particularly valid to assert that Post-Communist political systems, 
by reason of disquieting historical experiences, intended to institute multifarious 
constitutional safeguards, so as to protect the pluralism of political parties. 
Therefore, the respective provisions can be construed with respect to the 
former exclusive role of the Communist Party. In this paper, we’ll briefly 
expound the rules of the Constitution and other law governing political parties 
in Hungary framed with the purpose of legally substantiating and sustaining 
pluralist democracy and the underlying multi-party system. 
 As a matter of course, countries in the former Soviet-bloc had had to comply 
with the Stalinist “constitutional” pattern, therefore, they had implicitly declared 
the autocracy of the communist party (e.g., Hungary in 1972 set forth, “The 
Marxist–Leninist Party of the working class shall be the leading force of 
society.”, Poland in 1952 stipulated, “The Polish United Workers’ Party shall 
be the leading political force of the society designated to build socialism.”). 
Nevertheless, memories of the multi-party system prevailing in Hungary before 
the communist-socialist era had not faded by the time of the change of regime, 
when Parliament annulled the provisions substantiating the exclusive power of 
the Socialist Workers’ Party under the Constitution. Nonetheless, as Halmai 
concurrently noted, law pertaining to political parties as a sub-division of the 
law of associations cannot per se ground the democratic functioning of the 
multi-party system, because these regulations have a limited scope of effect.3 
Consequently, the observance of the effective legal environment established 
during the 18 years following the political transformation would be an in-
  
 1 See, Para. 59 of Decision of 1995 of the European Court of Human Rights on Vogt v. 
Germany: “The Court proceeds on the basis that a democratic State is entitled to require 
that civil servants are loyal to constitutional principles, on which the State is founded. In 
this respect, the Court takes into account the calamities Germany had suffered under the 
Weimar Republic and during the woeful period that followed the collapse of that regime up 
to the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949. Since Germany intended to avert the contingent 
recurrence of those experiences, it founded the new State on the concept of a ‘democracy 
capable of self-sustenance’.” 
 2 Sajó, A.: Az önkorlátozó hatalom (The Self-Limiting Power). Budapest, 1995, 18.  
 3 Halmai, G.: Az egyesülés szabadsága (Freedom of Association). Budapest, 1990. 
161. For the discussion of law governing the one-party system, see, 135–139. 
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dispensable condition of the democratic functioning of the multi-party-system 
even in our days.  
 
 
1.  Freedom of the Foundation of Political Parties 
 
1.1. The Definition of Political Parties and Their Functions 
 
The freedom of the foundation of political parties is derived from the concept 
of the freedom of association, since political parties are construed as special 
associations to be governed by specific rules as to their purposes and functions. 
The specificities of law pertaining to political parties, which derive from their 
specific constitutional relevance established in 20th century, are adequately 
intelligible on the basis of the conceptual position of the pertinent rules. 
Scilicet, the freedom of the foundation of organisations is conceived as a civil 
right within the scope of the fundamental freedom of association under Art. 
63 and the political freedom of the foundation and functioning of political 
parties is stipulated under Art. 3 of the Constitution of Hungary. Such reversed 
positioning of the pertinent regulation has been frequently criticised for its 
inconsistency,4 nevertheless, it can be justified on grounds of the prominent role 
of political parties as ‘intermediaries’ between the State and the individual, 
as instruments to effectuate the will of the citizens between elections.5  
 Political parties are not regulated under all constitutions, since the framers 
of constitutions tend to exclude that area.6 Nevertheless, the Constitution of 
Hungary specifies rules pertaining to political parties as follows: “Political 
parties [...] may be freely formed and may freely function, provided that they 
respect the Constitution and other law established in accordance with the 
Constitution” (Para. 1 of Art. 3), “political parties shall participate in the 
formation and declaration of the common will of the People” (Para. 2 of Art. 3), 
“political parties may not directly exercise public authority, therefore, they 
may not control State organs...” (Para. 3 of Art. 3). Whereas, it does not 
  
 4 On the pertinent provision of the Constitution of Poland of 1997, see, Chmaj, M.: 
Freedom of the Foundation and Functioning of Political Parties in Poland. Polish Political 
Science, 2001. 103. 
 5 Halmai, G.: Kommunikációs jogok (Rights Related to Communication). Budapest, 
2002. 237. Quote from 206 BVerfGE 20, 56 (101). 
 6 Sólyom, L.: Pártok és érdekszervezetek az alkotmányban (Parties and Interest Organi-
zations as Regulated under the Constitution). Budapest, 2004. 27. As Sólyom established, 
“the history of Hungarian codification cautions that omnis definitio periculosa est.” 
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circumscribe the concept of political parties, nor does other pertinent law, such 
as Act 2 of 1989 on Associations or Act 33 of 1989 on the Functioning and 
Finances of Political Parties (hereinafter: Act on Political Parties), therefore, it 
shall be construed on the basis of the specified functions. The latter statutes 
specify further conceptual elements of functioning, e.g., nomination of candidates 
for elections, democratic functioning, publicness of finances, exercise of 
public authority by representatives, reservation of membership for natural 
entities. Accordingly, political parties are civil organisations with extra 
functions (which, according to the current Head of State of Hungary, is a 
“staggering concept of political parties”). Although, the freedom of the founda-
tion of political parties is construed as a form of the fundamental civil right of 
association, it may be limited by law pursuant to constitutional authorisation, 
so as to demarcate the manners and the scope of interference by the State and 
public authorities.7  
 
1.2. Normative Framework of Functioning 
 
a)  Equality  
The right of the foundation of political parties construed as associations shall 
be unrestricted as a condition of the equality and fair competition of political 
parties: the entry of new entities in the competition can be guaranteed in this 
manner.8 Furthermore, during campaigns, since the neutrality of public authorities 
is prescribed, each political party will have equal chances to become a governing 
party or a party in opposition.9 Equal opportunity is meant to be guaranteed 
by way of equal legal remedies or by the delegation of representatives to 
electoral committees pursuant to law governing elections, such as Act on Election 
Procedures,10 pursuant to Art. 3 of which, the equal chances of candidates 
are stipulated, whereas, Art. 106 provides that local public media shall at 
least once, free of charge broadcast political advertisements of nominating 
organizations and of candidates for mayorship in proportion to the nomination 
or electoral lists, from day 15 preceding voting to day 3 before voting. All 
independent candidates are entitled to exercise this right jointly, in proportion 
to their nomination. On the final day of the election campaign, national organs 
of media shall broadcast a round-up on eight nominating organisations that 
have put forward most candidates for representatives and mayorship on the 
  
 7 Halmai: Freedom of Association. op. cit., 147. 
 8 Sólyom: op. cit. 64–65. 
 9 Halmai: Rights Related to Communication.  op. cit., 238. 
 10 Act 100 of 1997 on Election Procedures.  
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basis of a nation-wide aggregation. Joint candidates and lists shall be taken 
into consideration according to their rate of nomination. 
 Therefore, the provisions of the Constitution and other law underwrite 
political pluralism, since they treat political parties on an equal basis.11 Equality, 
however, is fundamentally contested by the effective method of financing 
political parties by the State (see below). 
 
b)  Purposes and Instruments  
The scope of objectives of political parties specified under deeds of foundation 
shall be supervised both upon registration and during functioning, as well. The 
most severe specified sanctions are the denial of registration and dissolution as a 
safeguarding measure, which independent jurisdiction is authorised to apply.12 
(N.B., The admissibility of dissolution by reason of risks known from history 
was a matter of debate in Germany and established with a view to hindering the 
reorganisation of totalitarian parties.)13 Nevertheless, according to the assertion 
of the current Head of State of Hungary (appointed to manifest the unity of the 
nation and to protect the democratic functioning of state organisation pursuant 
to the Constitution), “The dissolution of a political party is always a political 
decision. The judgement whether or why a party is deemed dangerous in re 
democracy is always dependent on the actual political situation, because it is a 
preventive measure.”14 Whereas, the European Court of Human Rights, which 
has been in several cases designated to decide on the substantive restrictions of 
the purposes of political parties, has consistently argued that the danger of the 
curtailment of democracy shall be an acceptable justification for limitations, 
especially for those the institution of which is necessitated by historical 
experience. 
 In 1998, in its Decision on Socialist Party and others v. Turkey, ECHR held 
that „one of the principal characteristics of democracy is that it creates op-
portunities for resolving the problems of a country through dialogue, without 
recourse to violence, even if those problems are irksome. Scilicet, a basic 
prerequisite of democracy is guaranteeing the freedom of expression, on grounds 
of which, no justification obtains for the elimination of a political group solely 
by reason of its endeavour to initiate and effectuate public debate on the 
situation of specific segments of the population and their involvement in public 
life, in order to seek democratic solutions to the mutual satisfaction of all 
  
 11 Cf., Chmaj: op. cit. 110. 
 12 Under Point d) of Para. 1 of Art. 3 of Act on Political Parties. 
 13 Halmai: Freedom of Association. op. cit. 143–144. 
 14 Sólyom: op. cit. 94. 
76 PETER SMUK 
  
parties concerned.”15 Concerning the appeal of another Turkish party, the 
Court argued that it derives from the core concept of democracy that diverse 
political programs may be put forward and debated, even those that contest the 
actual organisation of a State, provided that the respective programs shall not 
violate democracy.16 
 Nonetheless, according to the argumentation of the current Head of State of 
Hungary, the special protection of the freedom of the foundation of political 
parties as a civil right of party founders is recognised as constitutional on 
grounds of the function of political parties as mediators between the State and 
the People, i.e., of the relatedness of its content to the fundamental rights of 
communication. Substantive restrictions can be admitted exclusively with 
regard to this relation. Therefore, as opposed to the indication of the objective 
of the political party (which may be reduced to the phrase: performance of 
the constitutionally specified duties of political parties), the specification of 
political purposes under the deed of foundation of the political party cannot be 
made mandatory (may not be required) under Hungarian law, furthermore, neither 
the submission, nor the existence of a political program shall be specified as 
requirements for the registration of a political party.17 With respect to funda-
mental freedoms of communication and law pertaining to political parties, 
the provisions that guarantee the freedom of mass communication need to be 
highlighted, since the freedom of the media (as the main battleground of the 
competition of parties) is a universally recognised prerequisite of political 
pluralism safeguarded by the prohibition of censorship.18 
 Nevertheless, various institutional guarantees de facto obtain to delimit the 
scope of purposes and instruments. Accordingly, the Preamble of the Consti-
tution stipulates that the Republic of Hungary is a state founded on the rule of 
law, which effectuates a multi-party system and parliamentary democracy, 
which, as an imperative, is further substantiated pursuant to Para. 1 of Art. 3 
with a limiting clause. A safeguarding provision pursuant to Para. 3 of Art. 2 
stipulates that no entity may attempt the forcible acquisition, exercise or the 
exclusive possession of public authority, consequently, every citizen has the 
right and obligation to take action against such attempts in all manners 
permitted by law. Furthermore, Para. 3 of Art. 3 precludes that political parties 
  
 15 Para. 45 of Decision of 1998 on Socialist Party and others v. Turkey.  
 16 Para. 41 of Decision of 1999 on Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey. 
 17 Sólyom: op. cit. 65–66. and 76–77. 
 18 Cf., Garlicki, L.: Principles of the System of Government in the Republic of Poland. 
In: Sarnecki, P.–Szmyt, A.–Witkowski, Z. (eds.): Principles of Basic Institutions of the 
System of Government in Poland. Warszaw, 1999. 61–62. 
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exercise public authority directly. Accordingly, no single party may exercise 
exclusive control of a Government organ. Pertinent statutes prohibit the founda-
tion of party organs in workplaces and provide that the exercise of the right of 
association may not involve criminal offences or a call for criminal offences 
and may not violate others’ rights and freedoms. Furthermore, on grounds of 
the exercise of the right of association, no military organisation may be 
established.19 
 
c)  Rules of Incompatibility  
Under the provisions of the Constitution, party membership shall be incom-
patible with the fulfilment of specific public offices, because the functioning of 
personae fulfilling these offices shall be attached to the requirement of 
impartiality, therefore, incompatible with the promotion of political causes. 
Consequently, the fulfilment of the offices of the Justices of the Constitutional 
Court and of the Head of State of the Republic of Hungary, of the Judiciary 
and the Persecution is incompatible with party membership.20 The prohibition 
of party membership as to the official personae fulfilling offices of the armed 
forces, of the police is stipulated under Para. 4 of Art. 40/B. In its pertinent 
Decision on Rekvényi v. Hungary, ECHR held that the freedom of association 
of the applicant, i.e., the General Secretary of the Independent Trade Union 
of the Police, was not violated under Para. 2 of Art. 11 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
prohibiting party membership of persons fulfilling offices of the armed forces, 
the police and certain offices of state administration. According to the argument, 
“in view of the background of Hungary’s recent history and the sustenance of a 
politically committed police force, which used to support a totalitarian regime 
  
 19 For a comparison, see, Art. 13 of the Constitution of Poland of 1997: The 
functioning of political parties and other organizations, the programs of which bear the 
marks of totalitarianism, Nazism, fascism or communism, as well as those whose programs 
or activities instigate racial or national hatred, admit recourse to force for the purpose of 
the obtainment of political power or of influencing State policy or secrete their organi-
sation or members shall be prohibited. In Poland, pursuant to Arts 6–7 of Act of 1997 on 
Political Parties, it is also stipulated that political parties shall not implement or take over 
the implementation of duties of public authorities specified as such by law and may not 
organize or establish political party organs at workplaces. 
 20 Cf., Para. 1 of Art. 30, Para. 5 of Art. 32/A, Para. 3 of Art. 50, Para. 2 of Art. 53 of 
the Constitution, cf., Para. 3 of Art. 178, Para. 3 of Art. 195 of the Constitution of Poland. 
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for decades, the Court considered the efforts to depoliticise the police by no 
means arbitrary.”21 
 
d)  State Subvention of Political Parties  
Whereas, it is stipulated under the Constitution that the State shall not interfere 
with the competition of political parties, the majority of European states are 
actively involved in financing parties from the state budget. Such an arrange-
ment has been established basically on the following grounds: on the one hand, 
with a view to the curtailment of the influence of private interest-groups, on the 
other hand, the more professional functioning of political parties as organs 
operating in the public sector should be facilitated by financial support.22 
Nevertheless, party-financing raises the moot questions concerning the position 
of the State and the equality of political parties. As a matter of course, the 
revenues of political parties always affect their respective positions in the 
competition, furthermore, revenues are indispensable for persistence. Therefore, 
the State has a crucial role as to the maintenance of the competitiveness of 
political parties, consequently, it may also violate the principle of equal 
opportunity. Evidently, for the purpose of counterbalancing such defaults, 
formal and normative criteria as to the scale of state subvention will have to be 
stipulated, which preclude the consideration of the programs and ideologies of 
political parties.23 This way, although, we may have reservations concerning 
the differences in financing parliamentary or non-parliamentary political parties, 
the current system of state subvention does undeniably sustain both the smaller 
political parties in opposition and the multi-party system. The current Head of 
State of Hungary raised the question, whether the State may be obligated to sub-
sidise political parties, if they cannot perform their constitutionally stipulated 
duties without state support.24 In view of the fact that the plurality of political 
parties (at least of two parties) is a prerequisite of the functioning of the 
current political and constitutional system, the answer needs to be affirmative. 
Therefore, the duties of the State encompass not only the recognition of political 
pluralism, but its promotion, as well, which implies the sustenance/organi-
  
 21 See, Para. 57 of Decision of 1999 on Rekvényi v. Hungary. For commentaries on this 
decision, see, Fundamentum, 3 (1999) No. 3.  
 22 Enyedi, Zs.–Körösényi, A.: Pártok és pártrendszerek (Political Parties and Party 
Systems). Budapest, 2004. 137. 
 23 Sólyom: op. cit. 120. 
 24 Sólyom: op. cit. 123. 
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sation of political pluralism and securing compensation in the scope of 
affirmative action for parties holding disadvantageous positions in opposition.25  
 The effectual normative framework of public financing of political parties 
is provided under Act on Political Parties, according to which, the results of 
the previous election shall determine the admissibility of publicising the 
finances of a political party and the scale of public funding. The obtainment of 
1 p.c. of the votes in national elections is stipulated for political parties as the 
lowest limit for entitlement to public funds. According to the German pattern,26 
Act on Political Parties further provides that the proportion of public finances 
may not exceed 50 p.c. of all revenues of political parties. This regulation, 
however, could not be upheld, in recent years, state funding has equalled the 
proportions of 80–0 p.c. of all revenues of parliamentary parties.27  
 Within the purview of Act of 1990 on Remuneration, Cost Reimbursement 
and Other Benefits of Members of Parliament, the fractions of parliamentary 
parties are entitled to receive different amounts of funding according to their 
positions (in Government or opposition), such as a monthly amount equivalent 
to the basic remuneration of twenty-five Members of Parliament, furthermore, 
30 p.c. of the basic remuneration of each member of the party/parties in govern-
ment and 60 p.c. of the basic remuneration of each member of the parties in 
opposition shall be granted for the coverage of expenses of operation from the 
budget of the Office of Parliament.28 Independent Members of Parliament shall 
be granted 75 p.c. of their basic remuneration in support of their work. The 
payment of a lower rate of remuneration for parties in Government can be 
explained by their privileged positions in state administration and infrastructure, 
whereas, the opposition in Parliament has been compensated by the specifi-
cation of such a distinction. 
 
  
2. Regulation of the Internal Organisation of Political Parties as 
Associations  
 
In the followings, we’ll provide a brief conspectus of the rather laconic regulation 
of the internal organisation of political parties under Hungarian law. As Halmai 
  
 25 On grounds of the territorial lists of political parties. Cf., Para. 2 of Art. 5 of Act on 
Political Parties.  
 26 See, Halmai: Rights Related to Communication. op. cit. 243–244.  
 27 Source: Financial reports of parties published on their websites. 
 28 Before 01. 01. 2003, the respective rates had been 25 p.c. and 50 p.c., thus, the 
difference has increased.  
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noted in 1990, in countries that had been subjected to totalitarian regimes, 
Constitutions stipulate explicit rules pertaining to internal democracy. These 
rules and the conforming regulation under Hungarian law governing political 
parties are designated to prevent the deformation of political life by giving way 
to totalitarianism.29 
 
2.1. The Constitution of Hungary does not require explicitly that political 
parties and other social organisations have a democratic structure or function 
according to democratic principles. Whereas, Act 2 of 1989 on Associations 
does require that democratic functioning on the basis of the principle of self-
governance is stipulated under deeds of foundation, that clause would need to 
be substantiated by the Constitution, since the stipulation of that requirement 
qualifies as a restriction of the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right of 
association. Nevertheless, as the pertinent argument of the current Head of 
State of Hungary generally applicable to constitutional democracies demonstrates, 
the requirement of democratic functioning can be inferred from the Consti-
tution: “If the Constitution establishes a democratic State, political parties, 
having a constitutive role in it, cannot function according to departing principles. 
The internal democratic structure of political parties derives from their consti-
tutional functioning. If the duty of a political party is the mediation the 
common will of the People towards the State, it will be organisationally apt to 
manifest the political will of the People within the political party, which may 
shape the program and policy of the political party. Nevertheless, it is primarily 
the role of political parties in shaping the will of the State that requires 
democratic will-formation within political parties. […] The State will be 
democratic, so far as mediation on the part of political parties guarantees that 
the People exercise sovereignty.”30 
 To evade further ambiguity, we’ll attempt to render a definition of democratic 
functioning. Hungarian statutes don’t provide many guidelines. The Polish Consti-
tutional Court, on the basis of the concept of political parties circumscribed 
under the Constitution, held that a political party should establish its internal 
organisation (membership and structure) on the democratic principles of 
equality and voluntary access. As Chmaj argued, “For the purpose of avoiding 
non-conformity of its purposes to the Constitution, a political party shall in 
its deed of foundation or other legal document define the purpose of its 
  
 29 Halmai: Freedom of Association. op. cit. 147. Cf., Para. 1 of Art. 21 of the Constitution 
of Germany, Para. 2 of Art. 10 of the Constitution of Portugal, Art. 6 of the Constitution of 
Spain and Art. 49 of the Constitution of Italy. 
 30 See, Sólyom: op. cit. 55–56. 
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foundation in relation to the scope of State policy and the purpose per se as 
well as the instruments specified for its realisation shall be democratic. [...] 
The phrase of ‘democratic methods’ refers not only to the ‘external’ scope of 
activities of a party, but also to its ‘internal’ activity.”31 Russian law governing 
political parties provides a concise list of binding democratic criteria, which 
includes: the insurance of openness of structure, formation of party organs via 
elections and majority decisions made by members.32  
  
2.2.Democratic Principles (that should govern the main aspects of the internal 
  organisation of a political party are as follows):33 
 
a)  Openness 
The finances of political parties are recognised as the most delicate aspect of 
public functioning. Therefore, Art. 9 of Act on Political Parties stipulates a 
warranting rule, according to which, financial reports of parties shall be publicised 
in the press or the Hungarian Official Gazette.  
 Membership in political parties is a further precarious element of openness, 
since the fundamental right of privacy encompasses the confidentiality of 
political commitment.  
 In its pertinent Decision, the Constitutional Court ruled that democratic 
political parties, which may not exercise public authority directly under Para. 3 
of Art. 3 of the Constitution, may claim the protection of their documents or 
files similarly to other legal entities on grounds of the privacy of personal data 
under the provisions of the Constitution and other law. Although, pursuant to 
Act on Association and Act on Political Parties, the exercise of the freedom of 
association is attached to publicity in specific areas, such as finances and deeds 
  
 31 Chmaj: op. cit. 105. 
 32 Cf., Art. 8 of Act 95-FZ of 2001: The activities of political parties shall conform to 
the elements of voluntary membership, equality, self-governance, legality and openness. 
Political parties shall be free to determine their internal structure, objectives, forms and 
methods of their activities in compliance with pertinent Federal Law. Accordingly, the 
operation of political parties shall be public, consequently, information on their consti-
tuency and program shall be accessible for the general public. The formation of oligarchies 
shall be prevented by guaranteeing equal opportunity for the citizens of the Russian 
Federation (for men and women without distinction) as members of political parties for 
participation in the Supreme Bodies of political parties, for candidature for the positions of 
representatives and various offices in the organs of state administration as well as in bodies 
of local self-governments. 
 33 Cf., Decision of 1952 of the German Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 2,1 ff.). Quoted 
in: Halmai: Freedom of Association. op. cit. 143. 
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of foundation, otherwise, functioning shall be attached merely to self-govern-
ance and the observance of democratic principles. Scilicet, the stipulation of 
public access to information of public interest under Art. 61 of the Constitution 
is a constitutional guarantee designated to promote the control of authorities 
that exercise public authority.34 
 
b)  Freedom of Establishing and Terminating Membership  
Restrictions of membership in political parties were already mentioned with 
respect to incompatibility, whereas, coerced membership is also prohibited. 
Some authors established that the citizens’ unlimited right to acquire member-
ship derives from the democratic features of the internal organisation of political 
parties.35 Whereas, according to the judgement of ECHR, freedom of association 
does not imply freedom of accession to political parties, since associations are 
on no grounds obligated to admit all applicants.36 
 With respect to the freedom of terminating membership in political parties, 
the provisions that guarantee voluntary withdrawal and preclude arbitrary 
exclusion are of great importance. Arbitrary exclusion is applicable, if the 
member is excluded for reasons indicated under the deed of foundation of the 
party, or, it is not the leader of the political party, but the Congress or other 
Supreme Body that decides on exclusion by a qualified majority. In some 
countries, political parties are obligated to include the rules of admission and 
exclusion as an obligatory element under the deed of foundation.37  
 
c)  Majority Rule and Exclusion of the Leader-Principle 
Democratic organisation evidently implicates these elements, however, Hungarian 
law governing associations and political parties is not explicit on these matters. 
What is merely stipulated under Art. 12 of Act on Associations is that the 
powers of the Supreme Body of the political party are secured by law, which 
is meant to prevent that an oligarchy in the party unsubstantiates internal 
democracy by acquiring the fundamental powers of members. Accordingly, the 
most important powers of the Supreme Body shall be: adoption and amend-
ment of the deed of foundation, admission and exclusion of members, election 
of the Party Leader, liquidation of the political party, nomination of candidates 
  
 34 Decision no. 34 of 1994 of the Constitutional Court (VI. 24.) (AB.), III. 2–3.   
 35 For a summary of this view, see, Halmai: Freedom of Association. op. cit. 143. 
 36 See, Cheall v. United Kingdom (1985). Quoted in: Sólyom: op. cit. 105. 
 37 Hungarian law does not specify such a rule, nevertheless, see, Point (2) of Para. 1 of 
Art. 9 of Act on Parties in Poland, and Point c) of Para. 2 of Art. 21 of Act on Parties in 
Russia. 
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upon the election of representatives to State organs, adoption of the political 
program of the party. Nevertheless, as to practical experience, we can discern 
that Party Leaders have overwhelming and ultimate influence over general 
members.38 
 
d)  Freedom of Expression of Members and Legal Remedies 
Freedom of expression is exercised in the scope of active involvement in the 
activities of organs of the political party guaranteed under Arts 9–10 of Act on 
Associations. A member of the organisation may participate in the activities of 
the organisation, may exercise the right of election or may be elected to its 
organs. Any member of the organisation may apply for legal remedies vis-a-vis 
majority decisions in case of unlawfulness. 
 
 
3.  Further Factors Determining Political Pluralism 
 
We cannot fail to mention other factors determining the functioning of the 
system of political parties constitutive of multi-party systems, which are of 
great importance with special respect to the competition of political parties and 
their equal opportunities. These may eventuate in a system of a duality or 
plurality of parties. The provisions of the Constitution that stipulate political 
pluralism may be expounded in their completeness exclusively with respect to 
these factors to be reviewed in the following: 
 
3.1.  Electoral Systems  
 
Majority electoral systems are destined to favour the most powerful and success-
ful party as well as ignore a large segment of votes, thereby, the composition 
of legislation fails to reflect the actual variation of the political standing of 
society. Due to the disproportionateness of such systems, the stability of 
government majority is satisfactorily achieved, which promotes the efficiency, 
but obstructs the accountability of Government. Whereas, proportional electoral 
systems further diversity in representation dependent on the size of constituencies, 
on the basis of a mathematical formula applied irrespective of the reach of 
political parties.39 Therefore, in principle, the proportion of representatives in 
legislation conforms to the proportion of votes obtained by the specific party, 
which, however, may entail the instability of government. Mixed-systems, 
  
 38 See, Enyedi–Körösényi: op. cit. 130–135. 
 39 Quoted in: Enyedi–Körösényi: op. cit. 255–263. 
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such as the multi-mandate electoral system attempt to combine the advantages 
of the two basic systems.40  
 Although, it is primarily majority systems that tend to generate two-party 
systems, the Hungarian party-system officiously progresses towards a bipolar 
structure, scilicet, in 2002 and 2006, the two largest political parties obtained 
90 p.c. of the votes in national elections. Nevertheless, these results are 
putatively rather ascribable to electoral behaviour, than to the electoral system.    
 
3.2.  Parliamentary Thresholds  
 
Both majority and proportional electoral systems establish thresholds as 
limitations of access to Parliament, so as to avert the fragmentation of the 
party-system and of Parliament.41 However, the system currently prevailing in 
Hungary obstructs the evolution and empowerment of new political formations, 
especially in view of the system of public financing of political parties, which 
further weakens the positions of smaller political parties. Thence, consequential 
and extensive groups of society lose the chance of representation in Parliament 
implying that their views fail to influence decision-making by the State and 
social will-formation.   
 Reservations concerning thresholds are grounded on the constitutional 
requirement of the equal opportunities of political parties. According to the 
argument of the current Head of State of Hungary, the institution of thresholds 
infringes the principle of equality, because, “although, the threshold limiting 
access of political parties to Parliament seems to be an objective criterion, the 
requirement of maintaining the efficiency of the functioning of Parliament 
cannot justify the prescription of holding the currently effective rate of 5 p.c. 
or other percentage of the votes for the admission of a political party to 
  
 40 In Russia, which lacked political pluralist traditions, the electoral system was framed 
by reformers with a view primarily to the establishment of the multi-party system. The 
system of proportional election has furthered the formation of political parties and 
movements. Sakwa, R.: Russian Politics and Society. New York, 2002. 166–167. 
 41 The German Bundesverfassungsgericht ruled in 1952 that the 5 p.c. threshold 
(Sperrklausel) prescribed in Schleswig-Holstein was constitutional, since the stipulation of 
certain degrees of thresholds is admissible, but raising it above this level shall be unlawful. 
Scilicet, the maintenance of the balance of democratic representation and of the efficient 
functioning of the legislative organ is imperative. Nevertheless, thresholds are designed to 
prevent democracy from the fragmentation of the political system. (BVerfGE 1, 208.) 
Quoted in: Szente, Z.: Európai alkotmány- és parlamentarizmustörténet (The History of 
Constitutionalism and Parliamentarism in Europe). Budapest, 2006. 243. 
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Parliament.”42 On the contrary, emphasising efficiency entails similar dangers 
to those inherent in the unlimited proportional electoral system and threaten 
the functioning of legislation per se.43  
   
3.3.  The system of financing political parties  
 
We’ve expatiated on the main aspects of the effective system of state 
subvention of political parties, finally, we need to highlight its effects with 
respect to the previously mentioned factors of political pluralism. As we noted, 
the system is based on the principle of efficiency (formerly: aptitude) and on 
the results of the previous national elections. That system, however, tends to 
exclude newly emerging and small political parties, since it will recognise 
them as efficient, on condition that they reach certain results in extremely 
expensive national campaigns (relying on their own sources). According to this 
rationale, new and small political parties are expected to compete relying on 
their own resources, while it is public financing that accounts for the 
“efficiency” of political parties currently in Parliament.44 Consequently, the 
gap between larger and smaller political parties is undeniably widening, since 
the political parties in Parliament are entitled to extensive, if not unconstitutional 
privileges, whilst, the ascent of smaller parties is sheerly precluded under the 
present system. 
 For the confirmation of this statement, we’ll inquire into the results of the 
national elections of 2006. Accordingly, four political parties in Parliament in 
the former parliamentary session obtained 97 p.c. of the votes. Only one party 
could surpass the prescribed 1 p.c. threshold of financing and a new party, that 
of the Christian-Democratic People’s Party was admitted to Parliament on the 
basis of a coalition agreement with Fidesz as its “pseudo” party. Ceterum censeo–
the effective regulation of financing of the multi-party system is designed to 
protect the concurrent political elite. 
  
 42 Sólyom: op. cit. 114. 
 43 Haberland, S.: Die verfassungsrechtliche Bedeutung der Opposition nach dem 
Grundgesetz (The Constitutional Concept of the Opposition pursuant to the Constitution). 
Berlin, 1995. 50, 56–57. 
 44 En passant, according to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, elections are designated to 
facilitate efficient governance by a parliamentary majority, and this objective shall legitimate 
the override of fragmented parties. See, Ipsen, J.: A politikai pártok [helyzete a Német 
Szövetségi Köztársaságban]. In: Államtan. Írások a XX. századi általános államtudomány 
köréből. [The Position of Political Parties in the German Federal Republic. In: Takács, P. 
(ed.): Political Science–Studies on General Political Science in 20th Century”]. Budapest, 
2003. 726. 
